As the European Union careens towards a bust up, Brussels goes for broke.
“Yachts are the closest a commoner can get to sovereignty.” – Charles Simonyi
Loss of sovereignty was an exceptionally sensitive topic during the decades-long process that led to the behemoth we know today as the European Union (EU). The promise of veto power was used to beat back opposition to the concept of the EU itself, sold as the ultimate backstop to protect the vital interests of the countries that agreed to join. It is no exaggeration to say that there would be no EU without this ostensibly inviolable commitment.
Like any good bait and switch, the bait has proved evanescent and the switch too slow to be obvious: The EU bureaucracy has been grinding away at weakening the veto over time. Not every decision should require agreement by all the members, after all, and expediency necessitates that certain minor ones—and even the technical-level implementation of a few major ones—be handled by expert central planners. By steadily expanding the definition of “minor” and widening the latitude afforded to the implementors, member-state veto power entered 2026 already unrecognizable from what had been assured.
Her democracy | Getty
A protracted battle over the EU’s latest iteration of Russian sanctions may well mark sovereignty’s last stand. The need to water down the 21st act of the sanctions circus and the dim prospects for a 22nd expose brittle tensions between national capitals and Brussels. Back when former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán could be wholly blamed for EU disunity, significant compromise could be struck under the covering fire of his alleged obstinance on Russia. Now, with his much-longed-for electoral defeat achieved, the true nature of the damage to national interests being contemplated can no longer be hidden from view. Here’s how the Financial Times frames it:
“Brussels is considering a new approach to Russia sanctions after Greece held up a large package of EU measures to protect a shipping tycoon. European officials are looking at ways to speed up approval of more targeted financial restrictions so that member states have less opportunity to use vetoes in negotiations...
Three officials said there was now work under way on how to curb the tactic, which has become increasingly prevalent in recent EU sanctions negotiations as capitals seek to protect companies still doing business with Russia.
One idea gaining traction inside the European Commission and among the most pro-Ukraine member states is to agree and implement sanctions individually or in small thematic batches rather than aiming for large packages for public relations purposes. The officials said this would lower the risk of measures being held up due to national vetoes.”
Miss me yet? | Getty
Surely, the saintly interests of Brussels should not be held hostage by a shipping tycoon—and a Greek one at that! Right? That’s almost as bad as letting a member of a “shadow fleet” sail unmolested through international waters.
Were things that simple, there would certainly be no need for us to explore what’s really going on, what it likely means for the upcoming winter gas crunch facing the EU, and our recent call that the final days of the bloc itself are far closer than most are modeling. Alas, Europe is nothing if not complex.
The shipping tycoon being referenced is a certain Mr. George Prokopiou, of whom we admit to knowing precious little, other than that the Financial Times just called him a tycoon. There are worse things to be called, perhaps, and maybe “oligarch” is being overused. Prokopiou’s sin is owning a company called Dynagas, which operates a fleet of specialized carriers for liquefied natural gas (LNG). You can probably guess the rest by now:
“Dynagas owns or manages five specialised Arc7 LNG carriers serving Yamal LNG, Russia’s largest LNG export facility.
These are not conventional vessels that can easily be replaced. Designed to operate year-round in Arctic conditions, Arc7 carriers are highly specialised assets that enable Russia to move LNG from one of its most important energy projects to global markets.
In other words, these ships are not merely transporting Russian gas. They are part of the infrastructure that makes Russia’s Arctic LNG exports possible.”
Anchors away! | Aukevisser
Prokopiou risked more than a billion of his euros to build these ships during happier times, with construction completed years before the war in Ukraine escalated in 2022. And lucky for the EU that he did, because the bloc has been, quite literally, taking every cargo Yamal LNG can produce for the entirety of 2026, with no sign of a slowdown. The New York Times was out with a report on Friday that makes one shudder at the pickle Europe would be in if Russian President Vladimir Putin had decided to take a less friendly approach:
“Nearly five months of war in the Middle East is complicating an already difficult annual rite in Europe: stocking up on energy for the cold months of winter.
Storage facilities for natural gas, which households and businesses use extensively for boilers and furnaces, are only 54 percent full. That’s the second-lowest level for summer since 2011, and the lowest for July since 2021, when Russia’s state-owned energy company was restricting gas supplies to Europe.
At the same time, continued airstrikes by the United States and Iran, and their effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, have slowed energy shipments out of the Persian Gulf. That has also complicated efforts in Europe to replenish storage.”
Despite this dire outlook, Brussels fancies it will no longer need Yamal’s bounty come January, in the dead of winter, when a Russian LNG import ban is slated to begin. At issue in the tussle over the 21st package was not whether Dynagas would be permitted to continue delivering its cargoes to the EU, but whether it should be allowed to traffic in Russian LNG at all, no matter the destination. As the Greeks argued correctly, this would have essentially no effect on the flow of Russian gas to global markets, but would merely hand lucrative shipping business to its non-European competitors, most likely the Chinese.
Reliably undeterred by reality, Brussels is maneuvering to implement sanctions in a thousand “minor” cuts, leveraging what it calls qualified majority voting (QMV) in lieu of unanimity. Under this threshold, à la carte sanctions—nay, economic policy actions—would require approval from only 15 of the 27 member states, so long as those voting in the affirmative accounted for at least 65% of the EU population. With just a 2.3% population share, Greece would be in no position to defend its national interests, and we are hard pressed to think of anything more Greek than shipping.
In other words, Greece’s veto is on the menu, and Brussels looks set to order it up for brunch.
Once normalized, expect the entire concept of veto power to fade into relic status. When absolute power is seized by unelected bureaucrats, they rarely deploy it judiciously, and all manner of terrible decisions are all but certain to follow.
We can think of at least two high-probability outcomes: First, the small member states will be run over by Brussels to the point where at least one of them decides to leave the bloc, thus fulfilling our call from late 2025; second, if the Greek concession is indeed overturned via the QMV route, Chinese interests are much less likely to be as friendly as Putin has been. In the throes of the upcoming gas crunch, Europeans can expect to pay top yuan for the very cargoes they are now eschewing.
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